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CONSTITUTIONS AND SPONTANEOUS
ORDERS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
MCGINNIS
A.C. PRTTCHARD* & TODD J. ZYWICKI**
Professor John McGinnis has written a perceptive and
provocative comment on our economic analysis of the role of
tradition in constitutional interpretation.' A brief summary of our
areas of agreement and disagreement may help set the stage for this
response.
It appears that Professor McGinnis substantially agrees with the
two central propositions of our article. First, he appears to agree
with our definition of efficient traditions as those evolving over long
periods of time from decentralized processes.2 Second, he explicitly
agrees that Justices Scalia and Souter have adopted sub-optimal
models of tradition because they rely on sources that lack the
qualities which mark constitutionally-efficient traditions? Given our
substantial agreement on these issues, we will not discuss these points
here.
But McGinnis also has several penetrating critiques of our model
worthy of further discussion. His critique proceeds along three
general lines. First, McGinnis articulates a "strict constructionist"
view of the Constitution, implicitly arguing that the process of legal
change should be rooted in the states.4 Under this view, the primary
role of the federal government is to protect federalism and state
autonomy as a "precondition" for the operation of this system.5
Thus, McGinnis implicitly rejects any role for a federal bill of rights
in limiting state discretion, except to the extent that such limitations
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** Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law. A.B. 1988,
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1. See John 0. McGinnis, In Praise of the Efficiency of Decentralized Traditions and
Their Preconditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 523 (1999).
2. See id. at 525-26.
3. See id. at 530.
4. See id. at 526.
5. See id.
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help preserve the preconditions for robust interjurisdictional
competition. Second, McGinnis argues that the need to create and
enforce these preconditions limits the appropriate scope for
spontaneous orders.6 According to McGinnis, a consciously designed
constitutional structure is necessary to create the preconditions that
enable spontaneous orders to develop. Third, McGinnis disagrees
with our alternative model that looks to common law and state
constitutional law as potential sources of constitutionally-efficient
traditions-he lists three specific disadvantages of our model.7 We
consider each of these critiques in turn.
I. STRUCrURAL LIMITS V. ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
McGinnis argues that structural constraints on the federal
government are necessary for efficient traditions to develop at the
state level.8  But he goes further, suggesting that structural
constraints also are sufficient for the development of efficient
traditions at the state level.9 He argues that federal constitutional
rights should be created and enforced against the states only to the
extent that they protect structural preconditions that foster robust
interjurisdictional competition."0
We agree that federalism and the other structural protections of
the Constitution-such as the separation of powers and
bicameralism-which fragment and decentralize power, are a
necessary condition for liberty.1 By forcing various government
actors to struggle against one another for power, these structural
protections raise the cost to government actors of misusing
government power to either transfer wealth to special interests or to
impose costs on society for their own benefit. When operating as the
Framers intended, federalism and the separation of powers pit
government actors in a zero-sum game, with the gains of one level or
6. See id.
7. See id. at 530-31.
8. See id. at 526.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 526-27.
11. Indeed, one of us has written extensively on the importance of federalism and
bicameralism in protecting individual liberty. See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and
Husk of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and its Implications for
Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 165, 169-83, 209-15 (1997) [hereinafter
Zywicki, Shell and Husk]; Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and Special Interests: A Public
Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L. REv. 1007, 1031-33 (1994);
Todd J. Zywicki, CH. Hoebeke, The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the
Seventeenth Amendment, 1 INDEP. REv. 439, 441-42 (1997) (book review).
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branch of government coming only at the expense of another level or
branch. By pitting the states against the federal government and
Congress against the President, the Constitution seeks to "contriv[e]
the interior structure of the government, as that its several
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of
keeping each other in their proper places.112 "Ambition," Madison
wrote, was to "counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
connected with the constitutional rights of the place."' 3
But those locked in this zero-sum game inevitably will try to
change the rules to make it a positive-sum game for themselves.
Thus, state and federal government actors seek to collude over the
allocation of authority and revenues, maximizing each level's ability
to distribute rent-seeking opportunities. The federal courts have
insufficient incentive to enforce violations of federalism and
separation of powers, especially when those violations further
policies favored by individual judges. Over time, the separation of
powers deteriorates into a system of collusion of powers, with the
individual elements conspiring to increase their collective powers.
While the eventual distribution of the spoils of increased government
power are uncertain, substantial gains from trade, coupled with a
sufficiently small number of actors, ensure that the collective action
necessary to create this surplus usually will be feasible. 4
While there are gains to trade among the actors involved, their
collective action imposes external costs on the public at-large. The
public is largely powerless to stop this collusion, and individual
citizens will generally lack the incentive to police these structural
protections. The costs to any individual of fighting this collusion of
powers will far outweigh any potential individual benefits. As a
result, federal and state actors will gain at the expense of the general
public. A close analogy exists to sellers' gains from agreeing to
cartelize a market to extract higher prices from buyers.
Federalism erects a useful barrier to rent-seeking behavior and
government overreaching by allowing individuals to exit an
oppressive jurisdiction. But this exit strategy is far from costless for
the individuals forced to move, and it provides little protection for
sunk capital investments. 5 Thus, while structural limitations on
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
13. Id. at 349.
14. See Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The
Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REv.
(forthcoming Dec. 1998) (copy on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
15. Indeed, McGinnis concedes that "[c]ompetition between governmental
539
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
government action are a necessary condition for liberty and limited
government, they are not a sufficient condition.
A bill of rights supplements structural protections when it fails to
constrain those who would misuse government powers for their own
ends. In particular, a bill of rights vests individuals with the authority
to challenge government action that imposes externalities on those
individuals. A bill of rights provides private individuals who lose in
this collusion-of-powers game with another chance to disrupt these
externality-imposing governmental bargains. Allowing a single
individual to challenge the constitutionality of a law reinforces
unanimity by providing one final check to ensure that the law reflects
public consensus and is not merely imposing external costs by some
on others.16 Moreover, enforcement of these rights is vested in an
independent judiciary, the body most independent from these
collusion-of-powers tendencies." The general public benefits from
the individual's effort to restrict the size and scope of government.
Thus, a bill of rights, enforceable at the initiative of individual
citizens, provides an important secondary line of defense against
government and special-interest overreaching that supplements the
primary protections provided by structural limitations. A bill of
rights is important precisely in those situations in which structural
protections have broken down. Both sets of protections are
necessary for an effective constitutional system.
Notwithstanding the need for both forms of protection, we
recognize that bills of rights are a secondary barrier against
government overreaching. Indeed, many of the judicial errors of
recent decades stem from making individual rights the primary focus
of constitutionalism. In many situations, judges have created
individual constitutional rights absent any showing that the structural
protections of the constitutions had failed to restrain rent-seeking.
Many critics, including McGinnis, have argued that this error has
been reflected in overenforcement of some rights, most notably in
jurisdictions is more imperfect than competition in private markets, and the efficiency of
the results is less certain." McGinnis, supra note 1, at 535.
16. In this sense, an individual challenging the constitutionality of a law is analogous
to the common-law jury, which serves the same unanimity-reinforcing function. See Todd
J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An
Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 961, 1010-14 (1996) (discussing the
unanimity-reinforcing effect of the common-law jury).
17. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of Independent
Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 1, (1994); Ejan
Mackaay, The Emergence of Constitutional Rights, 8 CONST. POL. ECON. 15,22 (1997).
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the areas of criminal and civil rights. 8
Two potential costs arise out of the recognition of rights:
underenforcement and overenforcement. For many rights,
underenforcement is the greater concern. Thus, much of the Bill of
Rights protects the rights of criminal defendants, a group whose
interests are not likely to be protected effectively by state
legislatures. Such a disfavored group may even be underprotected by
some state judiciaries. Moreover, people may not focus on the
fairness of the state's criminal justice system when making decisions
about where to live, especially when weighed in the balance against
low crime rates. A person deciding where to live is more likely to
focus on the prospects of being a victim of crime rather than the
treatment if accused of committing one. Most people underestimate
the magnitude of low probability events such as an arrest and
therefore are likely to undervalue the importance of constitutional
criminal procedures. A bill of rights provides a counterweight to
these tendencies toward underenforcement.
At the same time, overaggressive enforcement of rights allows
judges and criminals to externalize the costs of their preferences on
society. More to the point, it undermines the incapacitation and
deterrent functions of criminal law. Our requirement that
constitutional rights should reflect at least a supermajority of the
states responds to criticisms that federal judges sometimes
overenforce rights.
II. CONSTITUTION-MAKING, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND THE
LIMITS OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER
McGinnis's second point builds on his commitment to structural
constraints. He agrees that we are right to celebrate spontaneous
order as a reflection of community consensus.'9 In contrast to our
model, however, McGinnis favors the spontaneous order of the
18. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 530. To the extent that Miranda and the
exclusionary rule have failed to accurately reflect societal consensus, we would agree with
Professor McGinnis that the Supreme Court erred in those cases. Moreover, as we
suggest in the main article, rights such as the right to counsel and the exclusionary rule
arguably have so little connection to any textual provision of the Bill of Rights that they
should be considered unenumerated rights subject to a Ninth Amendment analysis. See
A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 513 (1999). Thus,
rights such as these should not be subject to incorporation under our understanding of the
Ninth Amendment. Nonetheless, more text-based examples could surely be found to
illustrate McGinnis's point; hence we treat it as a more general critique.
19. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 523.
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states-exercising power as independent sovereigns-competing for
residents in a Tiebout competition.0 While celebrating spontaneous
order, he also places strict limits on its scope. In particular, he sees a
role for conscious design in constructing a constitution that will
create and preserve the preconditions necessary for interstate
competition to flourish.21 Those preconditions include federalism
and other limitations on the federal government's powers, such as
freedom of speech and, presumably, freedom of travel. At the same
time, however, McGinnis concedes that his model does not provide a
mechanism for constitutional change to respond to changing
circumstances.22
McGinnis sees constitution-making, rooted in positive law and
conscious design, as necessary to create the institutions that foster
spontaneous orders.23 McGinnis focuses on the limits of spontaneous
orders. He recognizes the virtues that a spontaneous order creates,
but questions whether the preconditions for a spontaneous order can
themselves come from spontaneous orders. As McGinnis observes:
"Federalism was not simply a product of spontaneous order but a
structure created as positive law by a fairly centralized process. 2 4 He
adds: "[I]t is federalism-the concept embodied in the doctrine of
enumerated powers-that was the Framers' most important
contribution to protecting decentralized traditionmaking."'
'
McGinnis finds himself in good company in raising this question.
Even Friedrich Hayek, the great advocate of spontaneous order,
questioned whether the constitutional preconditions for society could
be spontaneously generated. While extolling the virtues of the
classical common law as the ideal legal system, Hayek also
articulated a detailed, and in some ways bizarre, "Model
Constitution. '26 We think Hayek erred when he succumbed to the
temptations of consciously-ordered constitution-making. In our
view, the history of the western world suggests that constitutions
evolve from spontaneous orders; they are not created. Throughout
20. See id. at 526-27.
21. See id. at 526.
22. See id. at 529.
23. See id. at 526.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See 3 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE
POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 105-27 (1979) (describing the provisions of a
"Model Constitution"); see also 3 id. at 107-09 (arguing for the need of a constitutional
tradition and shared agreement of pre-constitutional values for constitutions to be
effective).
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the western world, individual rights and limitations on government
power have resulted from struggles that are unique to particular
times and places.2 7 Constitutions, therefore, simply have reflected
the results of these struggles.
The story in the United States confirms this account. While
federalism has played an essential role in protecting decentralized
decisionmaking, we question the extent to which federalism was the
result of conscious design by the Framers. The 1787 Convention was
called at the behest of the states acting under the Articles of
Confederation. The Framers themselves were delegates of the states,
and ratification came through state-by-state action rather than a
national plebiscite. No stronger federal government could have
garnered the consent of the states; the broad sovereign role of the
states under the original Constitution reflected contemporary
political reality, not conscious design favoring decentralization.
This political reality arguably reflected a spontaneous order, as
the states independently developed out of the original colonies. The
division of the New World into separate colonies hardly sprang from
conscious design; rather, it arose from arrangements that the Crown
made with British entrepreneurs who were willing to venture into
unknown territory. The very coming together of the colonies to form
the United States in the first place occurred in order to fight the
policies of the Crown, not any plan for a central government-no one
colony would have had the strength to defeat the British Army. To
the extent that federalism and separation of powers reflect conscious
choice, they reflect a choice to imitate the British "constitution,"
which evolved completely through decentralized processes.O In
making this choice, the Framers relied on tradition.
Where federalism has been created by conscious design, the
results do not inspire confidence. The European Union, for example,
appears to function primarily as a mechanism to dampen competition
between member countries and thereby bring all members up to the
same level of oppressive regulation. We would suggest that
American federalism has succeeded precisely because it did not arise
from a central plan for the political organization of the North
American continent. When the virtues of federalism were held up
for examination and conscious design in drafting the Fourteenth
27. See Mackaay, supra note 17, at 23-27.
28. Cf. Barry R. Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 6-9, 15-21
(1995) (discussing the role of federalism in protecting the economic systems in England
and the United States).
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Amendment, federalism was effectively gutted as a potent source of
constitutional values. The result has been the steady expansion of
the federal government-and indeed, government generally-that
McGinnis decries. Thus, we would argue that the process of
constitution-making itself usually must be the result of a spontaneous
order if the resulting constitutional regime is to foster spontaneous
orders. At least this observation seems to be an accurate description
of the origins of the United States Constitution..
The Constitution also was formed in an atmosphere that was
especially conducive to the creation of constitutionally-efficient
rights. Put differently, the political dynamics of the era were such
that the Framers could create a constitutional structure that merely
recognized spontaneously-generated rights, rather than bowing to the
demands of special interests seeking constitutional protection for
their favored projects. The political reality of active and powerful
state governments limited the powers of the federal government,
thereby limiting the ability of federal officials to extract rents and to
impose agency costs on the country and to supply rent-seeking
legislation.?9 At the same time, demand was low for special interest
legislation, as few special interest groups were operating on the
national level."
The distinction between a spontaneous order and a designed
system is even more striking when considering constitutional change.
McGinnis correctly identifies the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments as the primary causes of the erosion of structural
constraints on the federal government. 1 But these amendments are
not aberrations; they are simply high points in an overall pattern of
rent-seeking in constitutional amendment under Article V.32 As soon
as a constitution is created that limits government agency costs and
rent-seeking by special interests, the very parties intended to be
29. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111,
135-36 (1993).
30. In this sense, the conditions in the United States in the post-Revolutionary War
period were comparable to those described by Mancur Olson as prevailing in Germany
and Japan following World War II. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES 75-77 (1982).
31. Indeed, the growth of the federal government, and particularly the growth of the
federal government as a machine for the production of rent-seeking legislation on the
national level, began almost immediately after the enactment of the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments. See Zywicki, Shell and Husk, supra note 11, at 174-75.
32. See generally Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 29, at 140-52 (discussing the
Eleventh Amendment through the Twenty-Seventh Amendment and arguing that the
increase in special interest activity has altered the amendment process).
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constrained will seek to remove those barriers. In short, the
constitution itself becomes a target for those who would benefit from
eliminating the restraints on legislative discretion that the
constitution imposes. This pattern is seen in the history of
constitutional amendment under Article V.
Indeed, this problem of government actors attempting to undo
constitutional restrictions is exacerbated by the structure of
Article V. Article V identifies two procedures for constitutional
change: (1) a constitutional convention or (2) ratification by two-
thirds of the House and Senate followed by ratification by three-
fourths of the states.3 The constitutional convention has never been
employed. As a practical matter, then, the Constitution can be
amended only when change is initiated by the action of two-thirds of
both chambers of Congress. This procedure gives Congress a
stranglehold on the agenda for constitutional change. Given this fact,
it should not be surprising that subsequent to the first eleven
amendments there have been no constitutional amendments limiting
the powers of the federal government. 4 Indeed, the passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment denied the states the most effective
mechanism they had to control the agenda for proposing
constitutional amendments.
Putting Congress in charge of the amendment process puts the
fox in charge of guarding the hen house. The results have been
predictable. Every amendment after the Bill of Rights has served
either to increase the power of special interests in the federal
government, increase the power of Congress and the federal
government to impose agency costs on the people, or both. 6
Admittedly, these venal motives have resulted in some constitutional
changes that are universally applauded, such as the abolition of
slavery by the Thirteenth Amendment. Such amendments, however,
are the exception rather than the rule. Article V cannot be relied
upon as a source of efficient constitutional change because it confers
agenda control on Congress, the branch of government most in need
of constitutional restraint.37
33. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
34. See George Anastalpo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United States: A
Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 806 (1992); Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note
29, at 151-52.
35. See Zywicki, Shell and Husk, supra note 11, at 213. The Seventeenth Amendment
eliminated state legislatures' power to select senators in favor of popular election. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
36. See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 29, at 152.
37. See id. at 160.
1999]
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A spontaneous order system of constitutionalism and
constitutional change is relatively immune to these problems. Special
interests and politicians have no single place they can go to secure
their desired changes. Power is decentralized and fragmentary.
Thus, a spontaneous order system of constitutional change is more
likely to generate constitutionally-efficient change than a centralized,
designed order.
For these reasons, we believe that both constitution-making and
constitutional change must be rooted in spontaneous order. To the
extent that the Constitution reflects constitutionally-efficient
principles, it does so because it reflects the outcome of a spontaneous
order process, rather than attempting to create a new constitutional
design whole cloth. Article V of the Constitution consciously
attempts to design a mechanism for constitutional change in light of
new consensus-and it has proven to be an abysmal failure in
achieving constitutional efficiency.
III. THE FINDING MODEL DEFENDED
To this point, McGinnis's criticism has been of the general
project of using tradition as a mechanism for constitutional
interpretation and change. Beyond that, however, he criticizes our
invocation of common law and state constitutions as sources of
constitutionally-efficient tradition. He also questions the efficacy of
our model in practice should the Supreme Court adopt it.
Before addressing the substance of McGinnis's observations, it is
worth noting the limited stakes at issue. A rejection of the common
law or state constitutional law does not resuscitate either Scalia's or
Souter's models. If our sources of tradition are rejected and our
criticisms of Scalia's and Souter's models are accepted, then this
rejection simply means that tradition should play no role in Supreme
Court decisionmaking. Although tradition is a theoretically sound
concept, under this analysis tradition should have no role in the
practice of constitutional law.
McGinnis criticizes our reliance on common law and state
constitutional law to develop new constitutional principles because
he believes it undermines the decentralization that we espouse in our
article. 8 McGinnis objects in part to the process of taking locally-
developed rights and federalizing them. When combined with the
incorporation doctrine, he argues that this portion of our model
38. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 530-31.
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would effectively end the experimentation and flexibility that drives
our system.39 Rather than allowing the tailoring of legal rules to local
needs, McGinnis contends that our model would impose a national
rule on all, squashing further innovation.
There are several responses to this argument. First, with respect
to enumerated rights, we believe that interpretations of such rights
arising from genuinely unanimity-reinforcing processes are entitled
to the same protection as those specifically contemplated by the
Framers. For example, to the extent that the law protects facsimile
transmissions based on prior protections for handwritten letters
contemplated by the Framers, facsimiles should be entitled to the
same constitutional protection. In addition, just as states are not
permitted to opt out of the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, we believe
that they should not be permitted to opt out of interpretations of
those Amendments developed through unanimity-reinforcing
processes. Our model does not allow the states to experiment with
unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, while our model might
have the effect of "freezing" particular doctrinal developments, we
are willing to pay that price to ensure the benefits of precommitment
and reduced agency costs. In short, our model of enumerated rights
is premised on the view that the Framers did not intend merely to
write a static laundry list of common-law rights in the Bill of Rights.
We believe that when they enacted the Bill of Rights they also
intended to include the common-law process for interpreting those
rights. To the extent that McGinnis's quarrel is with the
incorporation doctrine generally, this point goes beyond the scope of
our project. We are making a more limited claim: the Framers
looked to state common law and state constitutions in drafting the
Bill of Rights. We agree with that choice and believe that it should
be carried forward. Incorporation is a separate issue.
For unenumerated rights, we share McGinnis's view that
incorporation would be ill-advised.4" We note, however, that
39. See id. at 530. Professor McGinnis observes:
The world changes, and traditions that may have been efficient at one time may
cease to be efficient. If they are made into federal constitutional rights applied
against the states, the traditions themselves become resistant to change because
they can only be challenged through the amendment process or through the
Court overruling its own precedent. Under the jurisprudence suggested by
Professors Pritchard and Zywicki, states may not be able to experiment with new
traditions because they will be blocked by Supreme Court precedent based on its
old predominant traditions.
Id.
40. McGinnis argues that our understanding of the Ninth Amendment is mistaken
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incorporation is not an all-or-nothing proposition: One can
incorporate enumerated rights against the states without also
incorporating unenumerated rights. Drawing the line between these
categories leaves room for judicial discretion. But the fact that a
large number of states would have to recognize the right under our
model reduces the risk of judicial error in drawing this line.
Consequently, the recognition of new rights only comes about after
long percolation in the states. Rash judgments by a bare majority of
the Supreme Court would not suffice to impose a rule on all of the
states. Far from fostering such percolation, the federal courts have
almost always been ahead of a supermajority of the states in
recognizing new constitutional rights. McGinnis's examples of the
exclusionary rule and Miranda strongly support this proposition. To
the extent that judges incorrectly draw the line between enumerated
and unenumerated rights, it will affect only the minority of states who
would not have to follow the right if it were classified as
unenumerated, but would follow it if it is enumerated. This seems
like a small efficiency loss in light of the benefits offered by our
approach.
Focusing on the details of incorporation tends to obscure the
real power of our mechanism for constitutional change. In the
modem age, the federal government remains the primary threat to
liberty. For the reasons McGinnis states so eloquently, the
competitive forces of federalism place some restraint on the ability of
state governments to impose agency and rent-seeking costs on their
residents. The federal government lacks even this modest restraint.
Thus, a system of constitutional change that is independent of
political agents in the federal government is necessary so that the
system can respond to rent-seeking threats by the federal
government. As a result, our model primarily seeks to recognize
rights enforceable against the federal government, not against the
states.
McGinnis also has practical concerns with our model. First, he
and that the "best reading of the Ninth Amendment is that it simply underscores the
limited enumerated powers of the federal government." Id. at 534 (citing Charles J.
Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's Forgotten
Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63, 63-64 (1987)). A full discussion of the interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment goes well beyond the current project. Given the expansive language
of the Ninth Amendment, however, it is our view that there is no reason to cabin its intent
to one exclusive purpose, but rather that it may have several purposes. Thus, reading it to
underscore the limited enumerated powers of the federal government does not rule out
reading it as a source of state-law rights or even natural rights. See Randy E. Barnett,
Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 35 (1988).
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suggests that even a well-intentioned Supreme Court would have
difficulty determining whether a particular state has recognized a
particular right. Retreating from a particular right would be even
more difficult because of the typical practice of distinguishing, rather
than overruling, precedents. Second, he suggests that our criticisms
of federal judges undermine our efforts to grant them law-finding
authority.
We concede that often it will be difficult to determine whether a
state has decided a particular issue. But, as we argue in our article,
specificity in the definition of rights has the benefit of narrowing the
scope of the federal judiciary's power." The costs of indeterminacy
on some issues must be weighed against the benefits of greater
determinacy on others. As to the remaining indeterminacy, the
current practice of federal courts applying the Erie doctrine might
provide an example of how our model could work. When there is no
authority precisely on point, the federal court could make an "Erie-
guess." When courts have no reasonable basis for making an
educated "Erie-guess" or if the state law is unsettled, then the
question could be certified to the state supreme court. Alternatively,
one could imagine a state supreme court criticizing the construction
of a particular state law right by the Supreme Court, thereby forcing
the Supreme Court to move that state from one column to the other
in the Court's survey of the law. The practical problems raised by
our model seem resolvable to a tolerable degree of certainty. No
theory of interpretation can eliminate judicial discretion.
McGinnis also argues that our criticisms of the motives of
federal judges undermine our suggestion that they should find the
law.42 Federal judges, we argue, are all too often unfaithful agents,
serving their own interests rather than their constitutional duties or
the public interest. McGinnis turns our argument against us. We
specifically recognize in our article that to the extent that our model
would actually constrain judicial discretion, the federal judiciary is
unlikely to adopt it. McGinnis adds that to the extent the federal
judiciary does purport to apply our finding model, it will not do so
faithfully. Instead, federal judges will use the finding model as a
smokescreen while continuing to "mak[e] up its own rules under the
guise of discovery."'43
In recognizing that judges may attempt to evade constraints
41. See Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 18, at 518.
42. See McGinnis, supra note 1, at 532.
43. Id.
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imposed upon them, McGinnis identifies the central problem of
constitutional interpretation. The demise of the common-law
tradition in the twentieth century has undermined faith in judges as
faithful constitutional agents.' Our model is not a panacea for the
decline of common-law judging. By supplying judges with an
external and neutral rule of decision, however, we believe that our
model does as well as can be hoped for any constitutional theory.
Agency costs cannot be eliminated from an independent
judiciary; we can only hope to maximize the benefits of an
independent judiciary while minimizing its costs. We think that a
law-finding model under which independent judges can alter the
Constitution, but must justify their actions in light of the consensus of
existing state law, maximizes the net social surplus of an independent
judiciary. McGinnis argues that our purported constraints are
actually no constraints at all. At its root, this question is an empirical
one and unlikely to be answered. We nonetheless think that our
model does more to enhance constitutional efficiency than does
McGinnis's model.
CONCLUSION
Professor McGinnis has written a penetrating critique of our
economic analysis of tradition's role in constitutional interpretation.
He agrees with two of the central arguments of our article: the
accuracy of our model of constitutionally-efficient tradition and its
application to the models of Justices Scalia and Souter. He disagrees
with our argument that common law and state constitutions provide
superior sources of constitutionally-efficient tradition. Economic
analysis, however, generally cannot answer the question of what
would be socially optimal: it can only compare the efficiency of given
practices. While far from perfect, we continue to believe that the
finding model of constitutional interpretation better serves the
efficiency purposes of constitutionalism than the available
alternatives.
44. See ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1984).
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